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BOOK REVIEWS 
Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World. By Robert 
Cummings Neville. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. Pp. 
xxxv + 258. 
Reviewed by Bryan W. Van Norden Vassar College 
At an international conference in 1991, people began to refer to Robert Neville and 
his colleagues as "Boston Confucians." At first the phrase was used as affectionate 
teasing and tongue-in-cheek self-description. However, Neville reports that, by the 
end of the conference, the phrase "Boston Confucianism" had come to be used as 
a semi-serious label for a particular view: the position that "Confucianism is not 
limited to East Asian ethnic application" and that it "has something genuinely inter- 
esting and helpful to bring to contemporary philosophical discussions" (p. 1). 
Neville's book, Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World, 
is a defense of these claims. 
In the process of defending his theses, Neville makes a number of points that I 
think are utterly incontrovertible. Ishall note five of his insights. The first three I shall 
just mention, but then I shall proceed to two that are particularly worthy of more 
extensive discussion. First, one need not be ethnically East Asian to be a Confucian. 
To deny this claim is as absurd as suggesting that one must be Greek in order to be 
a Platonist or an Aristotelian (p. xxii). Second, in order to be a viable, contemporary 
"world philosophy," Confucianism must have (and has yet to develop) ways to 
accommodate cultural diversity and pluralism in practice. Third, Confucianism must 
show that it is not inconsistent with the insights of modern science. (This is particu- 
larly an issue if, like Neville, one is attracted to the more metaphysically baroque 
forms of Confucianism that developed in the Song and later dynasties.) 
Neville's fourth insight is that the Confucian notion of "ritual" is a category 
that could significantly deepen and broaden Western philosophical discussions. 
Neville suggests that the semiotic work of the American pragmatist Charles Sanders 
Peirce provides a useful framework for understanding and enriching the Confucian 
emphasis on ritual. Neville's comments on Peirce are suggestive, but I wonder what 
Neville would say about the "functionalist" approach to ritual pioneered by Emile 
Durkheim. Durkheim argued, in works such as The Elementary Forms of Religious 
Life, that participation in ritual activities functions to express and (more importantly) 
maintain the individual's commitment to society.1 Several commentators, including 
A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (who independently developed an approach to ritual similar to 
that of Durkheim) and more recently Robert F. Campany, have noted that this sort of 
functionalist interpretation of ritual is quite similar to that advanced by Xunzi more 
than 2,500 years ago.2 Functionalism helps us to understand (in naturalistic terms) 
why ritual is so important, why it is perfectly acceptable for it to take different forms 
in different societies, and why the decay of ritual leads to excessive individualism 
and, in Durkheim's phrase, "anomie." As far as I can see, all of this is at least con- 
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sistent with what Neville says about ritual, but I would be interested to know 
whether he thinks functionalism adds anything to a Peircean construal of Confucian 
ritual. 
Finally, Neville presents an insightful critique of the positions developed by David Hall and Roger Ames in their trilogy of books.3 It is worth spending some time 
on Neville's critique, since Roger Ames and the late David Hall are so well known 
and have been such influential figures in contemporary comparative thought. 
Neville objects that "their method of contrasting cultures by generalizing to basic 
principles and trivializing exceptions follows the Western ... strategy of developing a grid of categories ... and locating thinkers and cultures within them.... This is 
surely an imposition of categories from without to the neglect of the concrete, a 
matter they ironically would consign to the West" (p. 49). Another way of putting 
this point is that Hall and Ames strongly oppose what they see as the dualistic ten- 
dencies in the Western tradition, and applaud the nondualistic tendencies in the 
Chinese tradition. However, they do so using a sort of "methodological dualism," 
which sharply distinguishes "China" and "the West," as if each were itself largely 
monolithic. Hall and Ames certainly do acknowledge that there are exceptions to 
their generalizations. But, as Neville suggests, there is much more complexity and 
subtlety in both "China" and "the West" than methodological dualism allows. 
Neville makes a related objection to Hall and Ames' application of the notion of 
"transcendence" to distinguish Chinese and Western thought (pp. 148-150). Hall 
and Ames write: "a principle, A, is transcendent with respect to that, B, which it 
serves as principle if the meaning or import of B cannot be fully analyzed and 
explained without recourse to A, but the reverse is not true."4 However, as Neville 
notes, "heaven, earth, and dao are all transcendent in the strict sense" (p. 149), even 
following Hall and Ames' definition of that term. Consider, as an illustration, the 
discussion of the dao in Daodejing chapter 25: 
There is a thing confused yet perfect, which arose before Heaven and earth. 
Still and indistinct, it stands alone and unchanging. 
It goes everywhere yet is never at a loss. 
One can regard it as the mother of Heaven and earth. 
People model themselves on the earth. 
The earth models itself on Heaven. 
Heaven models itself on the Way. 
The Way models itself on what is natural.5 
The dao certainly seems to be described as transcendent in this passage. 
Neville also observes that Hall and Ames' own definition of transcendence 
actually does not apply to many of the Western concepts that they use to illustrate it. 
I agree with this point, but I am unsure about Neville's way of arguing for it. He says 
of Hall and Ames that "in all their examples-God, a Platonic form, the unmoved 
mover, a classical atom, a decisive will-the transcendent principle cannot be 
explained in itself, only in its explanatory function" (p. 150). Neville's argument 
seems to be that A cannot transcend B if A cannot be explained to us humans with- 
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out reference to B. I am not sure that this follows from Hall and Ames' definition. But 
part of the problem here is that it is not clear what Hall and Ames mean by "the 
meaning or import" of something. Do atoms (as conceived by, say, Lucretius) tran- 
scend ordinary physical objects? Hall and Ames state explicitly that they do,6 but it 
is hard to know how to apply their characterization of transcendence to this case, 
because "meaning" and "import" are not central concepts in classical atomist phil- 
osophical views or methodology. Leaving tricky cases like this aside, though, I agree 
with Neville that there are many major Western philosophical movements that it 
would be misleading to describe as "transcendent." Aristotle, for example, sug- 
gests in Metaphysics Z that the "primary substances" are ordinary, everyday physical 
objects, whose matter, form, function, and "efficient cause" all interrelate to make 
them what they are. 
So I find myself pleasantly in agreement with Neville on a number of impor- 
tant points. In fact, I have only two disagreements worth mentioning. One is that, 
precisely because I agreed with so many of this book's major theses, I wondered 
whether it actually advances the argument in the field in an important way. Are we 
being told anything we didn't already know? (When I was in graduate school, we 
used the phrase "New Wave Confucianism" to describe the same basic position that 
Neville identifies with "Boston Confucianism." So Neville's label is original, but the 
concept is not.) However, perhaps the points this book makes are controversial to 
more of the major figures in the field than I realize. 
This relates to my second difference of opinion with Neville, which has to do 
with how the two of us conceptualize the field of Chinese and comparative philos- 
ophy as a whole. I was surprised, for example, by how much space and energy this 
book devotes to the views of Tu Wei-ming. My own view is that Tu occupies a 
position in contemporary Confucianism roughly equivalent to that of a serious, sin- 
cere Christian evangelist, one who is charming in personal presence and delightful 
and effective as a public speaker, but not a Biblical exegete, theologian, or historian 
of religion, and not regarded as such by those who are. Neville is aware of the con- 
cern that certain versions of Confucianism may seem "bland" (p. 84). He strives 
valiantly to make something sophisticated and "piquant" out of Tu's comparison 
of Confucianism and Kierkegaardian existentialism (pp. 86ff.). However, I ended up 
thinking that the similarities are not illuminating of either Kierkegaard or Confu- 
cianism. Tu's main point seems to be that, according to both Kierkegaard and Con- 
fucianism, living well requires an intense personal commitment to the source of 
value (God or the dao, respectively). But this is a very thin similarity. For example, Aristotle is neither an existentialist nor a Confucian, but he, too, stresses that one 
must "choose" virtue for its own sake. 
Perhaps my objection will be more clear if I say a little about what I consider 
to be a more helpful comparison of Confucianism and existentialism. In his "Moral 
Decision in Wang Yang-ming: The Problem of Chinese 'Existentialism,'" David S. 
Nivison points out that there are superficial similarities between the two positions: "there is much curiously existentialist-like talk about 'freedom' and 'nothingness' between Wang Yang-ming and his students."7 However, "'Nothing' for Wang's 
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disciples seems to mean an absence of preconception or selfish interest that could 
attach or bind us to things. For Western existentialists, consciousness is 'nothing' 
because it must be other than its object, which 'is': while the object so to speak just 
sits there, a thing 'in itself,' we are things 'for ourselves,' as it were, tipped into the 
world, concerned with open possibilities of dealing with it. One could argue that this 
is the direct opposite of 'nothing' as 'nonattachment.'"8 Furthermore, for Wang and 
his disciples, "freedom is spontaneity and is something they take for granted that we 
want to have; indeed the task of self-cultivation is to adjust our understanding of 
ourselves so that 'obstructions' to spontaneity, all anxiety or hesitation, fall away. 
For both Kierkegaard and Sartre our freedom is a terrifying burden, its exercise 
painful, something we can never really escape, though we will hide it from ourselves 
if we can."9 Perhaps the most important difference is that "Wang seems to be in the 
last analysis an 'intellectualist,' not a 'voluntarist' in ethics." In other words, Wang 
thought that there was some objective truth to discover within ourselves, and that 
this can and should be our ethical guide.10 For existentialists of either the theistic or 
atheistic variety, the claim to follow such an inner guide would be a paradigmatic 
instance of "bad faith." 
Nivison has certainly not given us the last word on this topic.11 But what I find 
preferable in a discussion like Nivison's is that it clearly sets out various positions, 
shows intimate familiarity with both the relevant Western and Chinese philosophical 
texts, takes into account historical context and the development of intellectual tra- 
ditions over time, and then tries to identify specific similarities and differences. The 
failure to do this kind of careful work is, I believe, one of the reasons that Tu Wei- 
ming's work has had little influence in the broader philosophical community. Per- 
haps, though, like Zhuangzi's well-frog, I have insufficient appreciation of what lies 
outside my own narrow perspective. 
Allow me to end on an irenic note. Let us heartily agree with Neville that Con- 
fucianism is in no way parochial to East Asia. And let us also agree that the various 
alternative formulations of Confucianism are in a league with the various formula- 
tions of Platonism, Aristotelianism, Kantianism, Vedanta, Buddhism, and others as 
participants in a world-philosophical dialogue. 
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Response to Bryan W. Van Norden's Review of Boston Confucianism 
Robert Cummings Neville Boston University 
Professor Van Norden's gracious claim that much of my point in Boston Confucian- 
ism was already known and accepted in his graduate school somehow makes me 
feel the way the Chinese emperor must have felt when he stood in the doorway 
looking south and the empire just fell into order. Whew! 
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